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FRONT END OF BALER 
(Lever Assembly shown) 
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against. 
____ --Exh. "D" 
Tractor 
hitch 
Note: Bolt and burr (Exh. "C") are inserted through 
Exh. "B" (sleeve) and through side of baler, anchoring sleeve 
to baler. Washers are placed next to burr. Washers are larger 
than sleeve, thereby allowing Exh. "A" (lever) to rotate 
freely over the bushing without coming off. 
(See Exh. "I", Owner's Manual, for more complete pic-
ture of baler without lever assembly.) 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of U tab 
AUSTIN F. WINCHESTER, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs.- No. 8219 
.EGAN FARM SERVICE, INC. 
Defendant-Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
FACTS OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Austin F. Winchester, hereinafter referred 
to as the plaintiff, lives at Mountain Green, Morgan County, 
Utah. He operates a farm and does considerable amounts of 
custom farm work or neighbors and customers in Weber, 
Davis and Morgan Counties. This work primarily consists of 
combining grain, land moving and leveling, and hay baling. 
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The respondent, Egan Farm Service, Inc., hereinafter referred 
to as the defendant, is a retail sales organization located at 
Ogden, Utah. It sells, services and assembles farm equipment. 
On or about September 18, 1951, plaintiff purchased a 
new "Long 50" baler from the defendant, who delivered the 
same to plaintiff's farm at Mountain Green. The baler was 
manufactured by Long Manufacturing Company of Tarboro, 
North Carolina. Upon receiving the baler at its place of busi-
ness at Ogden, Egan Farm Service attached a lever assembly 
mechanism to the front part of the baler. ( T r. 4) This lever 
mechanism extends forward from the front of the baler so 
that the baler operator, who sits on a tractor to which the 
baler is hitched, can manually put the baler in or out of opera-
tion by adjusting the position of the lever. It reaches from the 
front of the baler to the right side of the operator as he sits 
on the tractor, the end of the lever being about even with, and 
about nine inches to the right of, the operator's hip. (Tr. 8~) 
To illustrate the principals involved in this appeal and 
to more clearly inform the Court of the operation of the lever 
mechanism, a diagram is found at page 3. The diagram 
generally illustrates the lever mechanism in operating and 
non-operating positions. 
Attached to the lever mechanism is a rod which extends 
farther back to other parts of the hay baler. When the lever 
is placed in upright position No. 1, it pushes against the rod, 
causing the rod to press an idler pulley against the belt drive 
of the baler. This causes the baler to engage and operate. On 
the other hand, when the lever is pulled downward into posi-
tion No. 2, it pulls on the rod, thus disengaging the idler 
pulley from the belt and causing the baler to cease operat-
ing. The baler motor still runs, however. On pulling the lever 
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into down pos1t1on, tension in created upon the lever by a 
spring attached to the idler pulley. This spring is about one 
inch in diameter. During the operation of the baler the lever 
is in an upward position 90 per cent or more of the time 
(Tr. 100); it is only when the baler operation is disengaged, 
with the motor running, that the lever is in the down position. 
After purchasing the baler in the fall of 1951, plaintiff 
baled approximately 1,000 bales of custom hay and about 300 
bales of his own hay-about two days of operation doing 
the loose ends of the summer harvest-and then put the baler 
in a shed for the winter. (Tr. 39) On or about May 25, 1952, 
he took the machine from the shed and took it to an area at 
the mouth of Weber Canyon for the purpose of baling hay 
for customers. He baled hay for about two weeks prior to 
June 16, 1952, at which time he suffered the injuries giving 
rise to the lawsuit. 
On June 16, 1952, while operating the baler in a field on 
a farm at South Weber, Davis County, plaintiff completed 
baling one piece of hay and took the baler from that field 
to another. Upon completion the first field of hay, he left 
the motor running and disengaged the operation of the baler 
by putting the lever in the down position. Upon arriving at 
the second piece of hay, and after putting the machine in 
position to bale and stopping his tractor, he turned to his 
right on the tractor seat for the purpose of releasing the lever 
from the down position and placing it in the upright position 
so that he could commence baling. (Tr. 31-32) Before he 
could place his hand on the lever, it suddenly disengaged, and 
the extremity thereof struck him across the nose and eye. 
(T r. 32) As a result, he suffered a broken nose and laceration 
and other injuries of the right eye. His permanent injuries con-
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sist of a greatly enlarged pupil in his right eye which refuses 
to expand or contract with variations of light intensity, neces-
sitating the constant use of dark glasses. He also suffers general 
disfigurement from his broken nose and unsightly disfigure-
ment of his right eye. He sustained financial losses arising 
from doctor care, hospitalization, drugs, medicine, transporta-
tion seeking treatment, and loss of earnings during the time 
when he was unable to return to work. 
In the short time he had operated the baler the lever 
mechanism had never before disengaged without manual as-
sistance, and, to his knowledge, it had never so disengaged 
during the time prior to his injury that three other persons 
had operated the baler for short intervals. (Tr. 34) 
Plaintiff commenced an action against the defendant, 
a n d joined Long Manufacturing Company a n d Dearborn 
Motors Corporation, the successor in interest of Long Manu-
facturing Company. Being unable to secure personal jurisdiction 
over the other two defendants, plaintiff proceeded against 
Egan Farm Service, alleging as to the lever mechanism, that 
it was "negligently and carelessly attached to the . . . baler, 
... and contained attachment parts which were weak, defec-
tive and insufficient in size and strength ... " (R. 001). Most 
of the other allegations concerning the nature of the baler 
and its defects were inapplicable to the defendant. 
At the trial, plaintiff contended that the base of the lever, 
at the point where it was attached to the baler chamber by 
means of a bushing (Exhibit "B") and a bolt, burr and washer 
(Exhibit "C"), actually did not in fact contain a bushing. 
Furthermore, plaintiff contended that defendant inserted a 
5/16 inch bolt (Exhibit "E") through the bushing area in-
stead of the 3/8 inch bolt which was required for proper 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
assembling. He contended that the failure to use a bushing 
and the insertion of the smaller bolt permitted the lever 
mechanism to slide upward sufficiently so as to allow the 
lever pin to slip past the catch which was anchored to the 
baler, thereby causing the lever to fly loose, inflicting the 
injuries complained of. 
After plaintiff put on his case and rested, defendant 
moved the Court for a dismissal and a directed verdict upon 
three separate grounds. The grounds generally asserted were 
those of ( 1) failing to establish negligence, ( 2) contributory 
negligence and ( 3) assumption of risk. After argument upon 
the matter, the Court granted the motion and directed a ver-
dict against plaintiff. AI though the court did not particularize 
in writing, it felt that plaintiff's case failed for the reason 
that he had assumed the risk of the defect which caused the 
injury complained of. The court subsequently denied plain-
tiff's motion for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS TO BE RELIED UPON 
BY PLAINTIFF ON APPEAL 
POINT 1. The court erred in dismissing the action and 
in granting a directed verdict in favor of defendant at the 
conclusion of plaintiff's case. 
(A) The evidence tended to prove negligence on the 
part of the defendant in assembling the baler. 
(B) The uncontradicted evidence introduced in be-
half of plaintiff did not prove that the accident was 
caused, as a matter of law, by reason of his sole negli-
gence; nor did the same prove, as a matter of law, that 
he was guilty of contributory negligence proximately 
causing his injuries. 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(C) The uncontradicted evidence introduced in be-
half of plaintiff did not prove, as a matter of_la:W~ t~at 
he assumed the particular risk from which hts 111Junes 
occurred. 
ARGUMENT 
(A) 
The evidence tended to prove negligence on the part of 
the defendant in assembling the baler. 
Although plaintiff, in its motion for dismissal and a di-
rected verdict, assigned the foregoing point as one of its 
grounds, the Court was not concerned with its position. Never-
theless, since the written record is silent, plaintiff will point 
out sufficient evidentiary facts justifying submission of the 
case to the jury from the standpoint of establishing causation 
and proving negligence on the part of the defendant in as-
sembling the baler. 
The testimony of Merlin Egan, president of the defendant, 
established the fact that a 3/8 inch bolt was required for 
properly assembling the lever mechanism to the baler chamber 
(Tr. 5). The bolt was inserted through the sleeve (Exhibit 
"B") so as to anchor the sleeve tightly to the baler when con-
structed as required (Tr. 10). Before the bolt was burred 
against the sleeve, the end of the lever was placed over it and 
washers larger in size than the sleeve were inserted against the 
sleeve, thus allowing the lever to rotate freely without coming 
off. 
Plaintiff contended that the lever mechanism was de-
fectively assembled in two respects, both or either of which 
10 
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could have caused the lever to uncatch and strike him as in-
dicated. 
( 1) Defendant did not install the required bushing; and 
( 2) An undersized bolt of improper length was used to 
anchor the sleeve to the baler. 
Further testifying under Rule 43 (b), U.R.C.P., Merlin 
Egan admitted that if a 3/8 inch bolt was put through a half-
inch sleeve (spacer) (Exhibit "B"), such as was being used 
for illustrative purposes-and which actually was removed 
from an identical baler belonging to Leslie Olsen at Eden, 
Utah (Tr. 22)-the assembly "wouldn't be right" (Tr. 12). 
It logically follows from Mr. Egan's testimony that the de-
fendant would be negligent in attaching the lever mechanism 
with an undersized bolt or without a sleeve (also referred 
to during the trial as a "bushing" or "spacer"). 
Plaintiff took the stand and testified that the lever pin 
(Tr. 48) fit into the anchor-plate catch 3/8 of an inch deep; 
he further testified that he observed up and down play in 
ji( the lever mechanism, amounting to possibly 3/8 of an inch 
free travel (Tr. 49). This discovery, made when he examined 
the lever after being released from the hospital, caused him to 
disassemble the lever mechanism. The existence of free play 
would allow the lever to raise and slip out of the anchor-plate 
catch, particularly since the lever was subjected to considerable 
Th\ pulling tension on the part of a large spring (Tr. 48, 49). 
In fact, plaintiff submits that it would not necessarily be vital 
that the exact amount of free play be proven for the simple 
reason that any amount of play in the assembly could allow 
11 
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for a gradual wearing against the anchor-plate catch, the net 
result being that the abnormal wear would eventually permit 
the lever pin to slip past its catch. This is a logical conclusion 
to be taken in view of the testimony of Merlin Egan, supra, 
and from the common experience of mankind. 
Plaintiff submits that, as the trial would have progressed 
in its logical order, he would have brought out evidence that 
Egan Farm Service, Inc., improperly assembled the lever 
mechanism on nearly every long "50" baler which it sold and 
assembled to the minimum point of showing that 3/8 inch 
bolts were inserted into 1/2 inch bushings (Tr. 12, 22, 24); 
and that this defect could have been remedied by drilling 
the baler chamber to 1/2 inch in size and inserting a 1/2 
inch bolt. 
Of course, plaintiff contends that his baler was much more 
carelessly assembled than just indicated. Plaintiff introduced 
the bolt which he took from his baler after the accident 
(Exhibit "E"-Tr. 45), and further testified that no bushing 
was present. The bolt was 5/16 inch in size, smaller than the 
3/8 inch bolt which defendant believed and stated to be the 
required size. 
Plaintiff refers to the recent Utah cases of Hooper v. 
General Motors Corp. (Utah, 1953), 260 P2 549, and North-
ern v. General Motors Corp. (Utah, 1954), 268 P2 981. In 
Hooper v. General Motors Corp., a suit against the assembler 
of a truck for damages sustained when a recently purchased 
truck overturned allegedly because the left rear wheel failed 
due to separation of its component parts, held, in reversing 
a directed verdict in favor of defendant that: 
12 
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I~ 
" . . . the assembler of an automobile, who pur-
chases wheels from a manufacturer, is liable to one who 
purchases a car from a retailer for an injury caused by 
the collapse of a wheel because of defects which would 
have been discoverable by reasonable testing or inspec-
tion. McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 
111 N. E. 1050, L. R. A. 1916F 696." 
It is submitted that the defendant could easily have seen 
and detected the defects complained of in this lawsuit for the 
reason that it assembled that particular part of the baler. 
Further continuing with the rules laid down in the Hooper 
case with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence to go to 
the jury, the Court stated: 
"Contrary to the instruction as given, the undisputed 
fact of post accident rim-spider separation may be 
( 1) some evidence of a defective wheel at the time of 
automobile assembly and, (2) some evidence of acci-
dent causation." 
The Court pointed out that the separated condition of the 
spider and rim of the wheel after the accident was some evi-
dence of a defective assembly. The further fact that the car 
had only gone 6, 700 miles with no prior damage ( cf: this 
baler used but slightly more than two weeks) was a sig-
nificant factor in the Court's reversal. 
The reasoning and the rules laid down in the Hooper 
v. General Motors Corp. case were cited with approval in 
the Northern v. General Motors Corp. case. Suffice it to say 
that both cases are strong authorities for plaintiff's position 
in this action and, because of their recent nature, the writer 
feels that the Court is not in need of extensive argument as 
to their effect and meaning. 
13 
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Plaintiff submits that defendant's negligence and the ques-
tion of causation were sufficiently established to present a 
jury question. 
(B) 
The uncontradicted evidence introduced in behalf of 
plaintiff did not prove that the accident was caused, as a matter 
of law, by reason of his sole negligence; nor did the same prove, 
as a matter of law, that he was guilty of contributory negligence 
proximately causing his injuries. 
If the Court agrees that there was sufficient evidence 
to go to the jury on the question of causation, the first of the 
points just raised: namely, that of sole negligence, has been 
sufficiently answered. Consequently, this discussion will con-
cern itself solely with the question of whether plaintiff was 
contributorily negligent in sustaining the injuries complained of. 
Although defendant raised the matters of contributory 
negligence and assumption of risk in its motion for dismissal 
and for directed verdict, there is very little distinction between 
the two defenses in most cases. In fact, the Restatement of 
Torts has combined the two into one defense. However, since 
the points were separately raised, this discussion will be divided 
into two parts, each part referring primarily to its particular 
heading. 
Prosser on Torts, Chapter 9 at page 3 79, points out the 
main distinction between the defenses of contributory negli-
gence and assumption of risk: 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
" . . . In working out the distinction, the courts 
have arrived at the conclusion that assumption of risk 
is a matter of knowledge of the danger and intelligent 
acquiesence in it, and that to the extent that this can 
be found recovery will be denied; while contributory 
negligence is a matter of some fault or departure from 
the standard of reasonable conduct however unwilling 
or protesting the plaintiff may be. The two may co-exist, 
or either may exist without the other." 
This discussion of contributory negligence will primarily 
relate to what constitutes reasonable conduct under the cir-
cumstances of this case. 
The precise question before this Court on the issue of 
contributory negligence is whether plaintiff, in reaching for 
the lever and in getting the side of his face in such a position 
that it received a glancing blow from the lever, was guilty of 
such unreasonable conduct under the circumstances that no 
jury question was presented. Defendant will undoubtedly 
maintain that plaintiff knew the lever was subject to consider-
able tension created by the spring, and that he knew that if 
the lever became disengaged, he would possibly sustain injury 
if he was in a position to be struck by it. 
In answer to such an argument-which seemed to impress 
the trial judge-the writer wishes to point out that most 
levers are subject to spring tension of one type or other. In 
fact, if there were no tension against levers, there would be 
nothing to cause their locking devices to stay in place and no 
purpose for their existence. These are merely elementary 
rules of mechanical engineering and physics. 
We must next ask ourselves if plaintiff's conduct was 
unreasonable, considering all possible inferences in his favor, 
15 
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in turning to his right to grab the lever and in getting his 
face into a position where it might be struck. Such might be 
the case if plaintiff had reason to believe that the lever might fly 
loose, but we must consider that the baler and lever mechanism 
were constructed so that the lever would reach forward to the 
tractor operator. From his position on the tractor the lever 
was always available for use (see diagram). Furthermore, the 
Owner's Manual (Exhibit "I", p. 2) clearly stated that the 
baler "has been soundly engineered and thoroughly tested to 
give you the best automatic pick-up hay baler that you can 
buy." Consequently, we face the fact that it was intended 
that the lever be in a position near the body of the operator 
and that it should not constitute a booby-trap. 
Plaintiff's evidence was that the operator of a baler is 
required to turn to his right for the purpose of reaching for 
the lever and for watching the pick-up assembly and other 
parts of the baler as the hay feeds into the baler during its 
operation (Tr. 87, 103). The operator of a hay baler never 
looks straight ahead of the tractor while baling; he must 
always look ahead out of the corner of his left eye, so to speak, 
and watch the baler pick-up (and other parts of the baler) 
as it follows the windrow with his right eye, with his face 
and body turned slightly to the right. The net result is that 
one's body and face are in position above the lever when in 
the downward position. 
Of course, the lever would be in an upward pos1t10n 
during operation, but its location and the operator's habit 
of turning to the right upon stopping so as to view the baler 
or to grab the lever when in the down position could certainly 
16 
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be anticipated by the manufacturer as a normal course of con-
duct. In fact, the writer has operated farm machinery all 
of his life and has encountered levers on every type of 
machine. True, they are designed to hold tension, but they are 
widely regarded as harmless items. Furthermore, many farm 
machines other than balers have levers located in close prox-
imity to the operator's body. That is where they have to be. 
Mere knowledge that a lever is subjected to spring tension 
surely cannot charge plaintiff with contributory negligence 
when a defect in assembly released the tension. Nevertheless, 
even assuming plaintiff's standard of care fell below that of a 
reasonable man as to the "spring tension" risk, he is not barred 
from recovering since he was not negligent as to the "defective 
assembly" risk caused by "free-play" in the lever assembly. 
Prosser on Torts at page 393, in commenting on this propo-
sition from a contributory negligence standpoint, says: 
"Such conduct will bar recovery only if it has ex-
posed the plaintiff to the particular risk from which he 
suffers harm.'' (Italics added.) 
Further quoting from page 396: 
"The accepted view now is that the plaintiff's failure 
to exercise reasonable care for his own safety does 
not bar his recovery unless his injury results from the 
risk to which his conduct has exposed him. In a leading 
Connecticut case, in which a workman violated instruc-
tions riot to work on the unguarded end of a slippery 
platform and was injured by the fall of a brick wall, 
it was held that he might recover, since his negligence 
did not extend to such a risk." 
Plaintiff submits that the defects in assembly caused and 
17 
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permitted the tension to pull the lever pin out of its catch, thus 
releasing it with great force. 
Quoting from 38 Am. Jur., Negligence, Par. 177, page 
853, the rule is further explained: 
" ... Therefore, there can be no contributory negli-
gence unless the defendant is guilty of negligence hav-
ing a direct and proximate causal relation to the injury. 
This observation is important, especially from the 
standpoint of the burden of proof, and in the direction 
of a verdict for failure to sustain the burden of proof." 
Quoting further from the same source at Par. 182, page 
859: 
"Exposure of known danger, however, is not always 
contributory negligence. It constitutes contributory 
negligence only where it is voluntary and unnecessary 
exposure to a dangerous instrumentality or condition, 
the peril of which is appreciated by the plaintiff. Even 
the most prudent man is sometimes compelled to take 
risks; at least some risk is apparent in the ordinary 
activities of life ... Men may properly and lawfully 
do work that is essentially dangerous in its nature, 
and a person engaged in the performance of such work 
may know that it is dangerous, and yet not be guilty 
of contributory negligence in the performance thereof, 
unless he voluntarily and unnecessarily exposes him-
self to the danger." 
And from Par. 184 at page 861: 
"An essential element of contributory negligence is 
that the person to be charged therewith knew, or by 
the exercise of ordinary care should have known, of 
the circumstances or condition out of which the danger 
arose." 
18 
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Also from Par. 190 at pages 866, 868: 
"Contributory. negligence is not imputable to a plain-
tiff for failing to look out for a danger for which he 
had no reasonable cause to apprehend, ... One without 
special knowledge of all the elements of dangef inci-
dent to a particular situation is not to be charged with 
contributory negligence if he exercised reasonable care 
so far as things appear to him ... " 
The Restatement of Torts cites two examples at Section 
468 to illustrate the rules just set forth: 
"1. The X Company uses a public alley as a place 
in which to load and unload its trucks. The company 
warns A that the alley is dangerous and orders him 
to keep out. Notwithstanding this warning, A enters the 
alley. A siding maintained by the company ends on a 
bank immediately above the alley. Due to the defective 
condition of the siding a coal car is precipated into the 
alley striking A. A is not barred from recovery by his 
consciously subjecting himself to the risk of being run 
down by the company's trucks. 
2. A while working as a mason in the repair of B's 
wall is warned by his foreman not to use a certain 
scaffold because there is no guard rail about it. While 
so working on the scaffold, a part of the wall, which 
through the negligence of B is in bad repair, falls. It 
strikes A and injures him. A is not barred from recovery 
against B although he might be barred had his injury 
resulted solely from his falling from the scaffold." 
The defendant might come back and try to avoid the 
general rule by saying that no injury would have been caused 
by the defective assembly were it not for the action of the 
spring tension of which plaintiff was aware. Again Prosser 
on Torts at page 397 provides the answer: 
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" ... Such cases frequently say that the_ plaintiff's 
negligence is not the 'proximate cause' of hts damage. 
It is, of course, quite possible that his conduct may 
not have been a substantial contributing factor at all, 
where the harm would have occurred even if he had 
exercised proper care. But in the usual case the casual 
connection is clear and beyond dispute, and no problem 
of causation is involved. What is meant is that the 
plaintiff's conduct has not exposed him to any foresee-
able risk of the particular injury through the defendant's 
negligence, and therefore is not available as a defense." 
In the Utah case of Glenn v. Gibbons and Reed Co. 
(1954), 265 P2 1013, plaintiff secured a jury verdict for 
damages to a large shovel which was being used to load gravel 
in a gravel pit. During the course of operations a large bank 
of gravel broke loose and descended upon the shovel, causing 
it to be damaged. The defendant raised the defense that 
plaintiff was contributorily negligent and, after the jury ver-
dict, a motion for directed verdict was granted against plaintiff. 
In reversing the trial court's decision and in reinstating the 
jury verdict, the Utah Supreme Court made the following ob-
servation: 
''The third basis for the motion for the directed 
verdict was that plaintiff was contributorily negligent 
as a matter of law. When the plaintiff viewed the pit, 
he became alarmed that his shovel was in a position 
of danger and when the operator refused to remove 
the shovel without direction from Newman, plaintiff 
did nothing further to extricate his property from the 
peril. Apparently defendant contends that plaintiff was 
under a duty to seize the shovel which was then under 
the control of his bailee, and drive it out of the pit 
himself. Plaintiff had no knowledge of the probable 
presence of water and wet clay at the base of the gravel 
20 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and no knowledge of blasting to be performed that 
night; his protest was based simply on the height of 
the face. Had he known all of the facts, he may have 
been held to a higher degree of care. Knox v. Snow, 
(Utah) 229 P2 874. Too, more than one inference 
can be here drawn as to what a feasonably prudent man 
would do under the particular circumstances, which 
makes the question of contributory negligence one for 
the jury. Baker v. Decker, 117 Utah 15, 212 P2 679." 
(Italics added.) 
Plaintiff submits that the foregoing case is entirely in 
point with the case now before the Court. In that case, plaintiff 
realized that there was a potential danger from the face of 
the gravel pit, but did not realize or understand that there 
was the presence of water and wet clay at the gravel or that 
there would be blasting performed that night; similarly, this 
plaintiff knew that there was spring tension on the lever, but 
he also knew that such levers would stay in place. What he 
did not know was that there was a defective assembly which 
would allow the spring tension to release. Had plaintiff known 
all of the facts, he certainly would have been held to a higher 
degree of care than was exercised. Consequently, he should 
not be charged with contributory negligence. 
The case of Glenn v. Gibbons and Reed Co. refers to an-
other interesting point which will undoubtedly be raised by 
defendant. In the foregoing quotation, it was pointed out 
that plaintiff became alarmed "that his shovel was in a position 
of danger ... " In this case, defendant will undoubtedly 
refer to plaintiff's testimony (Tr. 57) that the lever did not ap-
pear to be working properly. However, plaintiff further testified 
(Tr. 50, 63, 68) that there was nothing about the lever which 
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caused him to fear it. He stated that he did not like the position 
of the lever and that it showed evidence of a poor design and 
that it was generally unhandy and in the way (Tr. 68) · He 
further testified that in the upright position (Tr. 95) the lever 
did not operate properly in that it did not cause sufficient 
tension to be applied against the belt pulley, thus allowing 
the belt to slip off occasionally. However, the lever itself had 
never before slipped out of its catch in either the upright or 
in the down position. In any event, the Court should not lose 
sight of the fact that an entirely different set of mechanical 
principles took effect upon the lever and the source of its 
tension while in the upright position from those working on the 
lever and the source of its tension while in the down position. 
Since the lever had never previously disengaged while in the 
down position, he had no prior notice of the defect complained 
of. The only defect about the lever which plaintiff noticed 
related to its inability to tighten the belt while in the upright 
position, and, as to this, he testified that, in his opinion at 
the time it was first discovered, it couldn't be remedied (Tr. 57). 
It is also expected that defendant will take the position 
that plaintiff knew, or should have known, of the precise defect 
i.e.; improper assembly, which caused his injury. In support 
of this position, defendant will undoubtedly contend that the 
bolt which was inserted through the sleeve and baler chamber 
was approximately 3/4 inch longer than the bolt ordinarily 
required. Defendant might further contend that plaintiff's ver-
sion of the manner in which the lever was assembled would 
not possibly allow it to work. 
In answer to the first contention as to the excessive length 
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of t~e bolt which was used, necessitating the addition of 
several washers, plaintiff testified (Tr. 94) that this particular 
bolt was basically hidden from view by another lever on the 
side of the baler (see diagram and Exhibit "I") and that the 
operation of a hay baler caused considerable accumulations 
of dust and hay leaves on all exposed areas (Tr. 94). Further-
more, it is a matter of common knowledge that one who pur-
chases a piece of new machinery can hardly be expected to 
know whether each precise part of the mechanism has been 
proper! y engineered, assembled and constructed. 
On cross-examining plaintiff defendant attempted to 
show, by means of illustration with the parts before the court, 
that the lever could not be put into the upright position 
without the presence of a bushing. So that this Court will not 
be misled (Tr. 92) plaintiff wishes to point out that the illus-
tration used in the lower court would not allow the lever to 
move into the upright position for two reasons: (1) Exhibit 
"D", which was used to represent the side of a baler, had a 
welded projection of about 1/8 inch which prevented the 
lever from sliding during the court demonstration (Tr. 109, 
110), and ( 2) the manner of the demonstration caused the 
bolt to be cinched tightly against the baler. 
If the Court will carefully examine Exhibit "E" (the 
bolt which plaintiff took from the lever assembly), it will notice 
that the burr was originally cinched against the end of the 
threads as tightly as possible. The groove is very pronounced. 
In fact, the burr was secured so tightly against the end of 
the threads that it caused the bolt to crystallize and break 
when removed. Consequently, with just enough washers to 
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allow the burr to secure the washers against the lever without 
inserting the required bushing-but yet not so tight as to cause 
a bind-the use of an undersized bolt and the absence of a 
bushing would still permit the lever to work, from all out-
ward appearances, in much the same manner that it would 
have normally worked had it actually had the required bushing. 
If the Court further considers that the entire lever mechanism 
was subject to pulley-and-belt or spring tension, it can see 
that the lever would still operate without giving the operator 
of the baler actual notice that it was defective. 
The defendant may place emphasis on the recent Utah 
case of Scoffield v. Sprouse-Reitz Co. ( 1953), 265 P2 396, 
which involved injuries to a salesman who fell over the side 
of a stairway having no bannister while calling on the manager 
of a defendant store. However, it is submitted that that case 
does not apply to the facts of this case for the reason that 
plaintiff there had "ample opportunity to observe and, as a 
reasonably prudent man, should have looked to locate the 
handrail before he attempted to put his weight on it." The 
case at bar is entirely different and more nearly fits the rule 
announced in the case of Glenn v. Gibbons and Reed Co. 
There seems to be no question but what the issue of con-
tributory negligence was clearly for the jury. An issue was 
presented which by all standards could not be resolved against 
plaintiff in view of the rule accepted in the Sprouse-Reitz Co. 
case that all reasonable inferences should be resolved in his 
favor. 
The case of Heckel v. Ford Motor Co. (New Jersey) 
13-8 Atl. 242, involved a situation wherein a rapidly turning 
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tractor pulley burst loose, striking plaintiff who was in the 
path of the flying parts. In pointing out that the case hinged 
on the issue of whether there was a defect in the pulley, 
the court said: 
"As before stated, it was for the jury to determine 
whether or not there was a defect in the pulley; whether 
or not the pulley did break or burst because of such 
defect; and whether the bursting so caused was the 
proximate cause of injury to the respondent." 
The interesting part of that case lies in that no issue was 
raised that plaintiff was contributorily negligent or assumed 
any risk in getting in the path of the pulley parts. That plaintiff 
knew that the pulley was rotating rapidly under great cen-
trifugal force and that if it disintegrated it would injure him. 
But he also knew that a piece of equipment properly manu-
factured and assembled does not break loose in such manner. 
Quoting from 38 Am. Jur. Par. 188 at page 865, it is 
stated: 
" . . . a question of contributory negligence does 
not become one of law for the court to decide solely 
for the reason that there is no evidence directly to the 
effect that the plaintiff appreciated the peril. In other 
words, it is for the jury to determine whether knowl-
edge of the physical characteristics of the offending 
instrumentality constituted a sufficient warning of peril 
to the plaintiff." 
(C) 
The uncontradicted evidence introduced tn behalf of 
plaintiff did not prove, as . a matter of law, that he assumed 
the particular risk from which his injuries occurred. 
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Prosser on Torts at page 3 76 outlines the elements of 
the defense of assumption of risk: 
"The defense of assumption of risk rests upon th~ 
plaintiffs consent to relieve the defendant o~ an obh-
gation of conduct toward him, and to take h1s chances 
of harm from a particular risk." 
The discussion set forth in the preceding section relating 
to contributory negligence contains the essential arguments 
which plaintiff contends will remove him from the category 
of one who has assumed the risk of the defective baler as-
sembly. Plaintiff has previously pointed out that he had no 
knowledge of the particular risk from which his injuries 
occurred; consequently, it is impossible to construe any consent 
on his part to accept the same. 
Not only must plaintiff have had actual or constructive 
knowledge of the risk involved, but he must have voluntarily 
made the choice of encountering the risk notwithstanding the 
peril incident to it. There can be no choice unless the person 
is aware of the precise risk. 
All of the cases are emphatic in stating that the risk must 
not only be known, but that the dangers arising from it must 
be appreciated. Plaintiff submits that had he known of the 
defects in the assembly of the lever, he would certainly have 
appreciated the danger involved and would have exercised 
his "freedom of choice" by repairing the lever, thereby elimi-
nating the risk itself. 
Plaintiff may refer to the case of Wold v. Ogden City 
(Utah, 1953), 258 P2 453. That case involved an action 
against Ogden City and a construction company for injuries 
26 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
sustained when plaintiff fell into a ditch which had been dug 
in the street in front of his home. On appeal from a motion 
dismissing the action, this Supreme Court held that, under the 
circumstances of the case, plaintiff had been contributorily 
negligent and had assumed a known risk, and, therefore, was 
precluded as a matter of law from recovering against either 
defendant. 
The Wold case is entirely dissimilar from the case at bar 
for the simple reason that the plaintiff in that case actually 
saw the hazard with his own eyes and "looked this situation 
over." Notwithstanding the dangers apparent to him, the 
plaintiff in that case attempted to cross a trench at 2: 30 
in the morning in an "extremely dark area, no lights, and 
in the middle of the night and in the shade of the trees." In 
its decision the Supreme Court quoted extensively from Prosser 
on Torts, quoting directly that "the plaintiff cannot be heard 
to say that he did not comprehend a risk which must have been 
obvious to him." The court further acquiesced with Dean 
Prosser that in the usual case, the plaintiff's "knowledge and 
appreciation of the danger will be a question for the jury; 
but where it is clear that any person of normal intelligence 
in his position must have understood the danger, the issue 
must be decided by the court." 
It was further pointed out in the Wold case that plaintiff 
had an easy alternate route to follow which would not have 
submitted him to the dangers of a trench cave-in in the middle 
of the night. Plaintiff believes the facts of the Wold case have 
no similarity to the case before this Court, although the law 
set forth therein is sound. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff submits that none of the defenses raised by de-
fendant in its motion for dismissal and for directed verdict, 
viewed in light of the evidence, justified the lower court in 
taking the case from the jury as it did. The evidence supporting 
causation and negligence on the part of defendant is strong 
and, as to the defenses of contributory negligence and assump-
tion of risk, it can easily be seen that the defendant did not 
know, and reasonably could not have been expected to know, 
of the particular hazard and risk which caused his injury. 
Unless plaintiff can be charged with having such knowledge, 
the case should have gone to the jury. 
Plaintiff requests that this Court reverse the ruling of 
the District Court of the Second Judicial District in granting 
defendant's motion for dismissal and for directed verdict and 
in denying plaintiff's motion for new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GLEN E. FULLER and 
JOSEPH Y. LARSEN, JR. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
32 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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